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Abstract. This paper aims to propose a model of investment account based on Islamic 
Financial Services Board guiding principles. The research figures out some factors affecting 
the process of deploying investment account, the proposed model, cost - benefit analysis as well 
as the steps to be taken by Islamic banking stakeholders to install the model in the future. 
Having reviewed many litetatures related to irregular deposit, investment account as well as 
the institutional theory, the study found that the adoption of investment account heavily relies 
on the political factor applied by Bank Indonesia. Law No. 21 Year 2008 that regulates 
Indonesian Islamic Banking clause 35 stated that Bank Indonesia has coercive power to drive 
the accounting and governance standard for the Indonesian Islamic banking. Other actors 
such as Financial Services Authority, National Sharia Board, and Indonesia Deposit 
Insurance Corporation also do affect the regulation on Investment Account. This paper 
informs the policy makers to set different regulation on investment account within the practice 
of dual banking system.  
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Abstrak. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mengusulkan model dan produk Investment Account 
sesuai dengan pedoman yang diberikan oleh Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB). 
Penelitian ini berusaha menyajikan faktor yang mempengaruhi implementasi Invesment 
Account, model bisnis, analisa biaya-manfaat serta apa saja yang perlu dilakukan oleh 
pemangku kepentingan di bank syariah. Setelah menelaah lebih lanjut literatur terkait dengan 
Irregular Deposit, Invesment Account dan teori Institusional, penelitian ini menemukan 
bahwa proses adopsi produk investment account sangat bergantung dengan Bank Indonesia 
seperti yang tercantum pada pasal 35 Undang-undang Perbankan Syariah No. 21 yang 
nantinya akan mendorong badan terkait lainnya seperti OJK, Dewan Syariah Nasional, serta 
Lembaga Penjaminan Simpanan. Penelitian ini pada akhirnya menginformasikan regulator, 
beberapa saran terkait peraturan yang dapat diimplementasikan pada sistem dual banking di 
Indonesia.  
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Introduction 
The Islamic Banks (IBs) in Indonesia has been introduced 25 years ago 
since the formation of the first Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (Ismal, 
2014; Ismal, 2010; Mukhlisin et al., 2015). Behind the fast development, the 
history of Islamic banking in Indonesia has been recorded in several phases. 
The first phase is the introduction phase that occurred in the era of 1992-1998 
by the approval of the law number 7-1992 and the government policy number 
72-1992 regarding the bank that operated under profit sharing system. 
Government via finance minister has allowed the bank to give ‘zero percent’ 
interest for its financing activities (Anshori, 2008; Ascarya and Yumanita, 2005).  
The second phase is called as “recognition phase” in the period of 1998-2008 by 
the endorsement of the law No. 10-1998 (amendment of law No. 7 1992) 
(Anshori, 2008). In this context, the government recognizes the Islamic bank by 
redefining the definition of commercial bank and rural bank from not only 
doing banking operation in conventional but also in Islamic way (Ascarya and 
Yumanita, 2005). The third phase is called the “purification phase” by the 
enforcement of the law number 21-2008 regarding Islamic bank (Anshori, 
2008).    
The establishment of Islamic bank cannot be separated from 
conventional counterpart. Both of the banking systems have some differences 
in terms of their philosophy and economic roles (Wan Ibrahim and Ismail, 
2015).  On the grassroots, the Islamic and conventional banks are operated in 
the same way (Hanif, 2011). For example, the implementation theory of deposit 
that genuinely should be treated as a mere custody (Bagus and Howden, 2012). 
Unfortunately, the epistemological error happens and the banks are now using 
the theory of irregular deposit rather than regular deposit ( Bagus, Gabriel and 
Howden, 2015; Bagus, Gabriel and Howden, 2016; Barnett II and Block, 2009; 
Nair, 2013; De Soto, 1998; Syamlan, 2016). The fallacy of the deposit theory not 
only happens in conventional banks but also in Islamic bank. The delusion 
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ensues on the pronouncement of the wadiah yad dhamanah instead of promoting 
wadiah yad amanah in Islamic bank daily operation (Farooq, 2011). Furthermore, 
the Islamic banks are also offering deposit product under a contract of 
mudhārabah (investment contract). Again the legal definition of deposit is not in 
line with the operational side of  mudhārabah since it offers “capital certainty” 
(Archer and Karim, 2009).   
Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB) has seen those issues as major 
problems in the Islamic bank. Hence IFSB standard on liquidity risk 
management as well as the government’s is in place to at least reduce the 
solvency risk of Islamic bank as well as the risk of non compliance to sharia. 
IFSB realizes that in the nature, Islamic bank has two major funding products 
which are investment account and non-investment account (IFSB, 2005; IFSB, 
2007; IFSB, 2006). The investment account is based on a tijāri’ (business) 
contract of mudhārabah which has the main feature of profit and loss sharing 
and has no “capital guarantee” feature. The non-investment account is based 
on tabarru’ (social) aqad of wadiah (trusteeship) and qardhul hasan (loan) (IFSB, 
2012).  Indonesia has joined IFSB since years ago and contributed their idea 
with other members in the form of standard. However, Indonesian Islamic 
banking industry somehow leaves the IFSB standard in its business operation. 
The funding products that offered to the customer are different than IFSB 
stipulation. The non–investment products are offered under a contract of 
wadiah and mudhārabah while the investment products are mainly based on  
mudhārabah (Ismal, 2011). Both types of funding products in Indonesia are 
guaranteed by Indonesia Deposit Insurance (LPS) and contravened with the 
IFSB Guidelines.  
This research focuses mainly to analyze some factors which affect the 
Indonesian Islamic Banks (IBs) to adapt the IFSB. Morever, this paper will also 
cover the future model of IBs based on the theories of deposit and investment 
account, the cost and the benefit, and what the stakeholder should do if 
Indonesia adopt it. 
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Literature Review 
The Irregular Deposit and the Reserve Banking System 
First of all, it is important to know that the ontology of deposit contract 
in the reserve banking system is divided into three, which are (1) Commodatum 
contract which is rooted from latin word refers to a real contract that made to 
divine faith whenever one person (the goods owners) entrusts his goods to 
other to be used for free in a certain stipulated time. At the end of the contract, 
the goods must be returned to the owner (Yeager, 2010; De Soto, 1998). In Islam, 
this contract is referred to qardhul hasan (Farooq, 2011). (2) The Mutuum contract 
on the other hand, refers to a contract that done by owners and borrowers 
which the owners lent out a certain quantity of their fungible to the borrowers. 
Moreover, borrowers at the end of the contract must return it back to an equal 
quantity as well as its quality (Lewis, 2007; Selgin, 2012; Yeager, 2010; Michael 
and Rozeff, 2010; De Soto, 1998). A daily life example of them is the monetary 
loan contract. For example, if Mr. Fulan has $1.000 and Mrs. Fulanah, his 
colleague, wants to make a loan, it means the loan contract happened. The 
$1.000 is now transferred to Mrs. Fulanah and should be paid back in the future 
for instance a month later. During the one month period, Mrs. Fulanah has full 
right to consume the money in a way that she wants. When the pay back time 
is due, Mrs. Fulanah has to fulfil her obligations of $1.000 to Mr. Fulan. To make 
it clear, there is an exchange of “present” goods for “future” goods or in simple 
words, for instance Mr. Fulan gave $1.000 with 10 pieces of $100 with have 
serial numbers 1,2,3,4,5,….,10. A month later, Mr. Fulanah might not pay back 
the amount with the same exact serial number since she has done consumption 
with the money. She pays the money back with a different serial number of the 
money that amounted $1.000. In Islamic banking context, we call it as wadiah 
yad dhamanah (Farooq, 2011). (3) Depositum contract, while the commodatum and 
mutuum require the transfer of availability as well as the benefit of the good, 
depositum contract or deposit contract in contrast entails the availability of the 
good and its benefit not to be transferred. Deposit contract is a contract made 
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by both depositor and depositary to move the good for the depositary to be 
protected guarded, and return it at any time that depositor may ask (Michael 
and Rozeff, 2010; Bagus and Howden, 2012; White, 2003; Yeager, 2010; De Soto, 
1998). Its purpose is for custody or safe keeping and the good should remain in 
favour of depositors. From the depositors’ point of view, they may ask a charge 
to guard the good or the deposit may free of charge. In Islamic context, we call 
it as wadiah (Farooq, 2011). The ontology of the deposit mentioned also act as 
the bases of the reserve banking system. The irregular deposit which stated 
above is the tools of the fractional reserve banking system (FRBS) which 
according to Meera and Larbani (2009), it is contravened to the maqasid sharia 
since it’s triggered the money creation without any underlying business.  
The concept of deposit in banking system is basically in line with the 
depositum contract and it has been practiced since the time of Roman Emperor 
(Ochaita, 2010). Furthermore, the goldsmith banking system changed the 
nature of the contract to be mutuum and started to make money by issuing the 
cheque/receipt to the depositors who placed their money. Banks then realized 
that not all depositors withdrew their money every day, thus it triggered them 
to utilize the fund for the purposes of gaining profit. That was the origin of 
fractional reserve banking  (Mallett, 2015; Quinn, 1997; King, 2012).  
Additionally, the legal suit has been happened in Spain and France in 
early 19th century whenever depositors sue the bank subsequently after failing 
to repay the depositors obligations. Regarding the case, at that time the court 
charged the Bank of Barcelona and Bank in Paris with a reason of breaching the 
commercial practices that recognized by Spanish jurisprudence and failed to 
maintain the fund possession at the moment the depositors should claim it (De 
Soto, 1998; De Soto, 1995a; Javaid, 2015). In South East Asia, the crisis was also 
triggered by the practice of fractional reserve banking system. The deposit from 
the depositors was used to fund the creditors and at the time of crisis when 
banks failed to serve the withdrawal (Radelet and Sachs, 2000; García et al., 
2004).  
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Fractional reserve banking system has been commented negatively by 
some economist from Austrian School of Economic. It is a risky behaviour that 
has been done by banks and considered as unethical behaviour (Bagus and 
Howden, 2012; Bagus and Howden, 2009; Bagus and Howden, 2011; Bagus, 
Gabriel and Howden, 2016; Bagus and Howden, 2010). Fractional reserve 
banking system treats money as a commodity rather than the medium of 
exchange (Hulsmann, 2003; Hulsmann, 2004). As a result of non-neutrality of 
money, banks starts to exploit the depositor’s fund and at the end might result 
severe shock like “bank run” (De Soto, 1995a; De Soto, 2006; De Soto, 1998).  
On the other hand, the other reserve banking system, the 100% Reserve 
Banking System (100%RBS), has instituted on the basis that money is only as a 
medium of exchange. So, the demand deposit which put at bank account is 
more like warehouse receipt. It means that the money which is deposited under 
demand deposit cannot be channeled into financing credit (Cochran and Call, 
1998).  
In this perspective, the neutrality of money in Islam is almost the same 
with the 100% RBS principle. Islam protects the money to neutral in every time 
by introducing the concept of riba (Hasan, 2011). Islam also treats money as 
actual capital instead of potential capital. When money becomes potential 
capital it refers to what has been done in fractional reserve banking system as 
well as irregular deposit whereas the money in demand deposit is used to fund 
a project or to make more profit for the benefit of IBs. Otherwise, the actual 
capital is akin to 100% RBS since the demand deposit will be idled and available 
at any time to serve the need of the depositors. In Islam, money is basically 
actual capital, a mere supporting transaction. If someone desires to generate 
more wealth with his money, he has to invest in a business or project or trading 
so that he bears a risk and gets the lawful profit. (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2013)  
The 100% RBS concept is flourished with an aim to omit the irregular 
deposit and fixed it so that in the future it will called as the regular deposit 
(Yeager, 2010; Hulsmann, 2004; Cochran and Call, 1998; De Soto, 1995a). At the 
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end, if the regular deposit is implemented the mismatch problem between the 
deposit and loan then it can be reduced accordingly (Bagus and Howden, 2016; 
Bagus, Gabriel and Howden, 2015; Bagus and Howden, 2009).    
The Islamic banks (IBs) have their unique feature compared to 
conventional banks. Indonesia as the moslem majority country also has its 
unique Islamic bank model along with its product. Indonesian IBs basically use 
two contracts for third party deposit which are (1) Wadiah based deposit: the 
wadiah genuinely is depositum contract. Islamic Bank in this context acting as a 
warehouse and should not transfer the benefit of the good fund for the sake of 
making a profit (Farooq, 2011).  Deplorably, Islamic bank that operates in the 
dual banking system faced through competition from conventional bank and 
at the end, forming a new type of wadiah in the contract of wadiah yad dhamanah. 
It fundamentally commingles two contracts which is wadiah (trusteeship) and 
dhamanah (guarantee), then it makes the aqad somehow akin to qard (Sahroni 
and Karim, 2015). The irregular deposit has happened due to the change of 
wadiah (depositum) to wadiah yad dhamanah which based on mutuum contract. In 
the context of Indonesian Islamic banking, it is used as the current account as 
well as saving account (Ismal, 2011; Ismal, 2014). The main feature is saving 
without any return to the customer. However, banks could give a bonus to its 
depositors based on their discretionary. Herewith, Islamic banks guarantee the 
money to be withdrawn any time. In the context of IFSB, this type of deposit 
also called non-investment account. (2) Mudhārabah based deposit: the 
relationship between customer and the banks is the investor-investee 
relationship whereby Islamic bank admits the fund as a deposit to be used for 
financing a project. Then the Islamic bank manages the money by investing it 
to earn a revenue or profit to be distributed to depositors. In the mudhārabah 
contract, the investment amount (deposit amount) might lessen due to the non-
performance of the financing activities. Bank gives no guarantee to depositors 
since its status of investment account (Anuar et al., 2014; Gilani, 2015). 
Nevertheless, there is independent body - deposit insurance - who gives 
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guarantee so that the  depositor's trust is increased to invest the money under 
this contract (Ebrahim, 2008). The irregular deposit happened also in 
mudhārabah saving in terms of deposit. Again, as the depositum contract, 
mudhārabah could not give some certainty in terms of profit and the capital. It 
also arises governance issues since it is an equity partnership contract that 
Islamic banks have.  
The unique feature of Islamic bank in terms of mobilizing funds adds 
more governance and sharia issue. As noted before, based on mudhārabah 
contract, bank has new stakeholder which is Investment Account Holders 
(IAHs). The treatment of the IAHs will raise a new issue whether should or not 
give a right to oversight their investment in the bank. In this section, the 
elaboration will both touch governance and sharia issues (Archer and Karim, 
2009; Hamza and Saadaoui, 2013). So, now the question is, does Indonesian 
Islamic bank practice the irregular deposit as well? The irregular deposit is now 
actually exist due to the 50% - 70% of IBs liabilities mostly the 1 month roll over 
mudhārabah deposit, which used for the long term project financing asset. The 
Indonesian IBs usually used the Bank Indonesia Wadiah Certificate to fulfil the 
depositor’s withdrawal. The irregular deposit also exist in Indonesian IBs due 
to the bigger liquidity gap, on the other hand the IBs short term asset basically 
couldn’t afford the short term liquidity (Ismal, 2008; Ismal, 2010; Ismal, 2011).   
 
IFSB Guidelines on Investment Account  
Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB), Malaysian based organization, 
has made the standard regarding the risk management framework for Islamic 
financial institution including bank. Among the standards, two standards will 
be used for the purpose of this paper which are IFSB Guidelines No. 1 - 2005 
regarding the Principles of Risk Management for Institutions other than 
Insurance (later stated as IFSB 1), IFSB No. 3 - 2006 regarding the Governance 
for Islamic Financial Institution (later stated as IFSB 3), IFSB No. 4 - 2007 
regarding Disclosure to Promote Transparency and Market Discipline (later 
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stated as IFSB 4). According to IFSB 1 there are 9 risks associated with IBs which 
is Credit Risk, Equity Investment Risk, Market Risk, Rate of Return Risk, 
Operational Risk, Displaced Commercial Risk, Sharia Non Compliance Risk, 
Fiduciary Risk and Liquidity Risk.  
For purposes of this paper, it will only focus on the liquidity risk, 
potential loss arising from their inability to fulfil the obligations either to 
depositors or to the debtor. IFSB in this case aware that Islamic banks have two 
major types of fund which are (1) Islamic demand deposit or the current 
account holder or those who hold current account and/or saving account. 
Islamic bank should guarantee the amount and should repay the fund to the 
depositor at any time. (2) The Investment Account-IA, which is served by 
mudhārabah, is divided into two types which are (a) Unrestricted Investment 
Account Holders (UIAHs), is the one who pose the investment account. The 
salient different of this type of account is that the UIAHs might bear the risk of 
capital loss if the investment is underperforming. However, IBs are doing 
“fund pooling” with comingling all of the UIAHs’ funds to various halal 
financing to give return to them. (b) Restricted Investment Account Holders 
(RIAHs). This type of account is operated under the mudhārabah muqayyadah 
principle whereas IBs only acting as the brokers to match the need of surplus 
unit and deficit unit. Consequently, IBs only take a small portion of 
underwriting fee. In this context, the shāhibul māl (surplus unit) is the one who 
is in charge to control the mudhārib (deficit unit) by stating certain business. The 
main difference between the IA and the demand deposit is sharing the profit 
as well as the losses.     
While the IA needs special treatment according to IFSB 3 and 4. The IA 
itself raises some governance issues, such as (1) Accountability whereas the IBs 
are accountable to the IAH in term of how they use the IAH fund. Especially in 
restricted mudhārabah whereby the depositor state some restriction on the 
investment and Islamic bank must strictly engage with the restriction. (2) 
Transparency; IBs must be transparent and disclose the income smoothing to 
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the investment Account Holders (IAHs). They are also must be transparent on 
the kind of investment policy, make report on the usage of IAH’s money and 
ensure it is based on economic reality, not on “window dressing” to make them 
happy. (3) Communication; Banks and the IAHs must have intense 
communication with the management of the investment. They must be 
provided information by information on their investment. It does not mean that 
they are given a bulk of information. Banks must be given timely information 
and only on the essential information like the investment policy and the usage 
of fund (4) Duty Care and Diligence; In managing the IAHs’ fund, the person 
who is in charge ought to manage the money based on duty care and diligence 
by carefully investigate the investment opportunities and risk, so he can give 
considerable rate of profit to the IAHs. In terms of purchasing securities they 
have to disclose the material information to IAHs like price, transaction party, 
fee, agent fee earned, etc.   
The vicarious monitoring which suggested by Archer and Karim (2009), 
is the same with the guideline on the IAHs which made by the IFSB. IFSB has 
come with guiding principles on corporate governance for institutions which 
offer Islamic financial services. These guidelines encourage IBs to establish a 
comprehensive governance policy framework which empowers each organ of 
corporate governance for balancing the IFI accountabilities to various 
stakeholders. The IFSB 4 guideline comes with an interesting idea, which is an 
establishment of the governance committee. If we compare its function with 
the audit committee, the governance committee monitors the performance of 
board and management from the stand point of the IAHs interest, while audit 
committee monitors primarily from the standpoint of shareholders. This 
committee will oversee and monitor the implementation of the governance 
policy framework by working together with management, audit committee 
and the SSB (Archer and Karim, 2009).    
Archer and Karim (2009) also said that according to sharia 
jurispundence, Islamic bank does not guarantee the value of the investment 
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accounts based on mudhārabah. The implication is, IAHs has no power like 
creditor who has the right of various control, which the creditor obtained by 
firms default.  The right of the creditor includes interfering in the major 
decision of the firm. The claim of IAHs on the earnings or assets is similar to 
the claim of the shareholder in the bank earning or assets. Moreover, the 
mudhārabah contract is neither a debt, a conventional equity instrument nor a 
type of conventional hybrid instrument comprising debt and equity 
characteristics. Generally speaking, IAHs as rabbul māl has no right to involve 
in day to day investment decision. It is because when they do it, the contract of 
mudhārabah will be void. When concluding the contract of mudhārabah for the 
first time, all the money and the right to control are transferred to mudhārib. 
Mudhārib , has the prerogative right to use the fund. He can re-invest it to other 
business and commingle with his own money to run the business. Otherwise, 
mudhārib  should strictly follow the requirements of rabbul mal in restricted 
mudhārabah and separate the funds with the shareholder funds particularly 
(Ameer et al., 2012).   
When the yield of investment is positive, the shares of profit are 
allocated among the parties of the contract, IAHs and the bank, according to 
the proportionate share. Bank also entitled to any profit earned form investing 
the funds provided by current accounts as well as a contractual mudhārib  share 
of profit allocated to the IAHs as its fee for managing their funds. Again, the 
bank’s profit is generated both from shareholder and other fund investment 
portfolio that does not participate in profit sharing. Hence the shareholders 
receive the entire profit from this source and IAHs cannot claim any profit 
share from them. On the other hand, if the earning of investment is negative, 
according to the mudhārabah contract, the loss should be borne by IAHs and 
shareholders based on their investments. Like the shareholders, the liability of 
IAHs is limited to the amount of their investment and no more. In the case of a 
negative return, in addition to the shareholder's proportion of loss that is 
determined, a bank in the capacity of mudhārib  receive no profit sharing fee on 
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behalf of shareholders. However if the loss is because of misconduct or 
negligence of the bank, then they should bear the loss (Ameer et al., 2012; 
Archer and Karim, 2009; Archer and Karim, 2012; Hamza and Saadaoui, 2013). 
 
The Institutional Theory 
A standard is created to promote some efficiencies in the business 
operation which resulted a trust between the stakeholders (Meeks et al., 2009). 
In the recent Islamic banking practice in Indonesia, some standards have been 
in place to govern the business operation and to ensure the fulfilment to its 
stakeholders. Beyond that, Indonesia is also included in the board member of 
Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB), Malaysian based institution that 
concern on the risk as well as governance of Islamic bank (IFSB, 2012; IFSB, 
2005; IFSB, 2006; IFSB, 2007). This paper elaborates why Indonesia Islamic 
banking has not adopted the IFSB standard especially the one that governs 
market transparency as well as the governance requirement of maintaining 
investment account. Using the theory that formed by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) regarding the Institutional Theory of Isomorphism, this problem is 
defined as the pressure that will be faced by an organization to set the rules. 
The isomorphism comprises three forms of pressure namely (1) coercive, (2) 
mimetic and (3) normative (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Mukhlisin et al., 2015).  
Coercive means the political pressure that impacts to the organization 
conforming to some standards while mimetic might be explained as a 
benchmark that might be used as a role model in the process of compliance 
with some standards and the normative isomorphism is the pressure that fit in 
to set the rules from the professional groups (Ekanayake and Perera, 2014; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).        
 
The Factors Affecting the Adoption to IFSB Standards  
Nowadays, in the context of the adoption to IFSB standards of market 
disclosure and the investment account, there is no legal or political pressure 
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that has been done by the regulator. The Islamic banking in Indonesia, has been 
operated under the law No. 21 the year 2008 (Mukhlisin et al., 2015). If we 
scrutinize that particular law especially on the accounting standard that will be 
used in the industry, according to the clause 35 verse 2 which stated “The Islamic 
Bank is obliged to disclose to BI all material information according to the relevant 
standard that has been govern with the BI Decree” (Ministry of Law, 2008).  
To some extent, this clause shows how powerful the BI in determining 
which accounting as well as governance standard that should be used by 
industry. Thus, BI issues BI Decree No. 14/14/PBI/2012 about Islamic Banking 
in Indonesia pertaining the transparency and disclosure of the financial 
statement. On that particular decree, BI coercively asks the Islamic bank to 
make additional report such as the zakat report, the qard funding report and 
the mudhārabah muqayadah report twice a year. Nevertheless, BI does not control 
the investment account separately to be in line with the IFSB 3 and 4 (BI, 2012). 
Interestingly, in 2015, Indonesia Financial Authority revised the decree that has 
been made by BI with OJK Decree No. 6/POJK.05/2015 regarding 
Transparency and Publications of Financial Statement and still the idea of 
making a separate disclosure for deposit based on mudhārabah is not included 
in that particular decree (OJK, 2015).    
Moving on to the mimetic isomorphism, Indonesia needs a benchmark 
from other countries which have the same culture as well as social environment 
who has adopted the IFSB 3 and 4. In this case, in the South East Asia, Malaysia 
is the only country that has adopted this standard since 2015 by the enactment 
of the Islamic Financial Service Act 2013 (IFSA 2013). Malaysia established the 
IFSA in 2013 and gave the Islamic banking to adapt this new standard for 2 
years (Hasan, 2014; Rosman et al., 2015; Kunhibava, 2015).   The Malaysian case 
of IFSB 3 and 4, can be used to minimize the uncertainty of compelling the new 
standard. This mimetic isomorphism will scrutinize deeper on the last section 
of the research which will discuss the action that to be taken by stakeholders. 
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Last, the institutional theory also touches on the normative isomorphism 
whereas in this case, no professional body which is related to Indonesian 
Islamic banking pushed the industry conforming to the IFSB 3 and 4 in terms 
of research publications or more practical recommendation like some proposal 
for deploying the standards (this research might be the first).  Finally, based on 
above explanation, the most influential factor that hinders the adoption of IFSB 
3 and 4 is the political factor or in other words, Bank Indonesia has the power 
to change the industry by making the specific decree for promoting market 
disclosure and the governance aspect of investment account. 
 
Method 
This research operated under the qualitative research with mixed 
method. This paper is using the critical perspective in the beginning to evaluate 
and censure the recent Islamic banking practices that still used the mudhārabah 
deposit as the venue of investment and also use the interpretative to give such 
directions for stakeholders for adopting the model. Moreover, this paper will 
only use the literature from journal that indexed in DOAJ, accredited journal 
according to Indonesian Higher Education, EBESCO, SCOPUS, as well as the 
ABS Journal that contain the topics of irregular deposit, investment account.  
This paper also use some standard that has been published by IFSB and 
AAOIFI regarding the market discipline and investment account.  Originality: 
This paper tries to construct proposed model for Indonesian Islamic Banking 
to operate under IFSB guidelines. 
 
Result and Discussion  
Future Model and The Cost and Benefit  
The Islamic Bank funding products now exist under the mudhārabah and 
wadiah contract. For the customers who are placed their money under 
mudhārabah contract or in the Indonesian case it is Mudhārabah Term Deposit, 
the return will be higher than the wadiah (Ismal, 2011). However, the 
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mudhārabah is equity partnership contract and not similar to the deposit 
contract (Archer and Karim, 2012; Archer and Karim, 2009). In this context, 
IFSB has come up with an interesting solution by defining the nature of Islamic 
Banking funding product into current account and investment account (IFSB, 
2005). Furthermore, IFSB subsequently has made the guidelines to operate the 
investment account under IFSB 3 and 4 which is basically focused on the market 
transparency and governance of investment account management to protect 
the interest of Investment Account Holders (IAHs) (IFSB, 2006; IFSB, 2007). The 
IAHs in the investment account framework basically is shāhibul māl (those who 
place the fund) and Islamic bank act as mudhārib (those who possess the 
project). In this case, IAHs is not the shareholders. Thus, they can’t put their 
representative to oversee the fund. In these circumstances, the situation of 
asymmetric information will happen in the future (Ameer et al., 2012). To cater 
the problem, especially when the IBs adopt the IFSB standards, it needs to 
construct the model first. Below is the proposed model if Indonesian IBs agree 
to operate under IFSB 1, 3, and 4:   
Figure 1. The Proposed Model 
Source: Ismal, 2011; IFSB, 2005; IFSB, 2007; IFSB, 2006 
From the figure 1, the proposed model is basically taken from the work 
of Ismal (2011) and then modified with the framework of IFSB 1, 3, and 4 as 
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well as the theory of deposit. In the first step, the IBs here need to identify the 
motivation of the customer. IBs might advise the customer to take the deposit 
product when they only intended to save the money in the bank for saving or 
transaction purpose to be the depositors. However, if the customer expected 
more return and risky product or on the other hand want to invest the money, 
IBs recommend the customer to change the investment account into the 
Investment Account Holders (IAHs). Here the IAHs is given adequate 
information before placing the money as well as the fund performance report 
quarterly. The second step after taking the funds for both depositors and IAHs, 
IBs in this case will separate the demand deposit with the investment account 
due to its different nature. Subsequently move to the third step which is 
channelling the investment account to finance the project with equity 
partnership contract, buy and sale contract as well as the purchase hire 
contract. The financing itself, should be aimed at the real sector as the main 
focus. The bank might invest the money to the financial sector merely for 
managing the liquidity. The fourth step, IBs might collect the profit or loss from 
the pool of fund to be shared only to the IAHs. In the fifth step, whether the 
fund resulting profit or loss, it will be shared. For example, they will share the 
loss if the funding is underperformed. In this case, IBs might have more 
weapons to maintain the depositors as well as the investors by deploying the 
profit equalization reserve (PER) and investment reserve requirement (IRR). 
Both weapons should be declared in the quarterly report to prevent the 
displaced commercial risk (DCR).   
To transform the Indonesian IBs operation to comply with IFSB 1, 3, and 
4, the cost and benefit analysis should be performed. The benefits of IFSB 1, 3, 
4 for Indonesian Islamic bank are: First, preventing the occurrence of 
asymmetric information. Herewith, the appointment of a member of 
governance committee will become another important point to be explained 
regarding the asymmetric information. The empowerment of governance 
committee is to ensure that IAHs right of monitoring the performance of their 
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investment and associated risks are exercised. The IAHs right to monitor their 
investment should not be misinterpreted as a right to intervene the 
managements. The only thing that governance committee should do which is 
also the need of IAHs is the disclosure of their policies and practices in respect 
of their investment account. The committee also has a duty to monitor the 
practice of smoothing return to preserve the transparency in any investing 
activities done by management as well as ensuring the transparency of 
financial reporting of the investment accounts. The expectancy of IAHs should 
be appreciated by conducting a sound investment strategy. 
They duty also extend to ensure that the matter of sharia compliancy is 
really applied. (Archer and Karim, 2009). The member would be preferable for 
the independent non-executive director which possess skills not only the ability 
to read and to understand financial statements, but also able to coordinated 
and to link the complementary roles and functions of the governance 
committee and audit committee. It will be necessary to put a member of SSB 
(Sharia Supervisory Board) for the purpose handling sharia- related 
governance issues if any. Another member, it will be a good addition to have a 
member which has expertise on legal to cultivate a good corporate governance 
structure (Archer and Karim, 2009).   
Second, preventing the Irregular Mudhārabah. Deposit to be more sharia 
compliance. Again, the nature of mudhārabah is purely investment and far from 
the concept of deposit. In this case, the investment account concept under the 
contract of mudhārabah will omit the irregular deposit since there is no 
guarantee to repay the principal back as well as paying the profit (Hulsmann, 
2004; De Soto, 1995b; De Soto, 1998; Archer and Karim, 2012; Archer and Karim, 
2009).  Moreover, by shifting the demand deposit product to the wadiah 
contract, it will stabilize the economy since it is fully ready for the customer 
withdrawal every time. 
Third, better education program for the customer as well as educating 
the customer to understand the sharia investment in the end might increase the 
TIFBR | Tazkia Islamic Finance and Business Review 
Volume 11(1), 2017 
 
98 
 
market share by the increase of disclosure of investment account. In this context 
we can refer to the IFSB 4 regarding market transparency (IFSB, 2007). In IFSB 
4 stated that there should be qualitative and quantitative disclosure.  The 
qualitative disclosure mainly focus on the product range, the suitable investors 
that suit to the product, the experience of the investment managers, the 
governance arrangement of IAHs funds by declaring the committee, the 
disclosure that IAHs’ Fund is invested in accordance with sharia, the allocation 
of asset, profit, expenses and the policies regarding the calculation of allocation 
as well as the profit distribution.  On the contrary, the IBs should also give some 
quantitative information such as the Return on Asset (ROA), the Return on 
Equity (ROE), the ratio of profit distributed to IA, the total amount of PER and 
IRR compares to the total of the fund.  
On the other hand, the costs of operating the IFSB 1, 3, 4 are as follows: 
First, the new committee should be formed. It is according to IFSB 3, whereas a 
new committee namely governance committee should be in place to oversee 
the IAHs’ Fund. In this case, the bank should pay the expenses of the new 
committee. Second, new disclosure regime should be operated. IBs should be 
prepared with the rigorous reporting. This painstaking regime needs more 
resources like IT as well as the human resources (the investment manager who 
at the end makes the report). Third, Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR). This 
risk is faced by the bank because of the competition with conventional banks 
in the dual banking system. It asserted the IBs shareholders to make provision 
so that they can do income smoothing to prevent mudhārabah funding customer 
migration from IBs to CBs due to the decrease of return. (IFSB, 2005; Hamza 
and Saadaoui, 2013; Abdullah et al., 2011). In this case, to prevent the DCR the 
establishment of PER and IRR are urgently needed. However, PER and IRR will 
strive the bank to maintain their Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) (Archer and 
Karim, 2012). Forth, the problem of accounting recognition. Investment account 
has its unique features. Genuinely, it is not fit if IBs classify it as liabilities since 
mudhārabah is the equity partnership (Rosman et al., 2015). Fifth, no guarantee 
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provided by LPS for the investment account (Archer and Karim, 2012; Archer 
and Karim, 2009). Sixth, the restoration cost will be high, since the recent model 
of banking will be restructured to the new model and it will incur big cost both 
for the bank and the regulator (Syamlan, 2016). 
 
Stakeholders Support to Comply with IFSB Standards 
Bank Indonesia (BI) 
As per above section, BI plays a big role in the development of Islamic 
banking. In this case, to implement IFSB 1, 3, and 4 BI should make at least 
circular letter regarding this matter. It is in order to empower the coercive 
pressure to the industry. BI in this case also should revise the Decree (PBI) to 
have the investment account in place. The decrees are: PBI No. 10/16/PBI/2008 
regarding the revision of PBI No. 9/19/PBI/2007 pertaining to the sharia 
principle in the funding and service (Anshori, 2008); and PBI No. 
10/17/PBI/2008 regarding the funding product for Islamic bank (Anshori, 
2008).   
Bank Indonesia needs to revise both regulations since in the decree; the 
mudhārabah is written as the mudhārabah deposit and should be revised to an 
investment account that is equipped by PER and IRR. Bank Indonesia in this 
case should mimic what Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) has been done 
regarding the IFSB compliance. What BNM has been done are: Issuing the 
Islamic Financial Act (2013). Herewith, this is a fundamental law which has 
been changed the definition of investment account that is before categorized as 
a deposit into real investment. It is written in section 2 (1) of IFSA 2013 
(Kunhibava, 2015; Rosman et al. 2015); issuing the Prudential Limits and 
Standards on Investment Account in march 2014 (Rosman et al. 2015); and 
issuing a standard to operate the PER by the ruling of guidelines number 
BNM/RH/GL 008-12 in 2008. 
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Indonesia Financial Authority (OJK)  
OJK needs to revise the OJK Decree No. 6/POJK.05/2015 which generally 
discuss the transparency on the financial report. Herewith, by the enactment of 
BI decree to push IBs to comply with IFSB guidelines, this POJK should be 
revised because there is an obligation for the Islamic bank to report general 
qualitative disclosure quarterly. Also there is an obligation for the Islamic bank 
to report general quantitative disclosure quarterly.  Regarding the risk and 
investment policy that is used by IBs, OJK does not need to make new decree 
since it has been already covered in POJK number: 1/POJK.07/2013 regarding 
the protection of financial sector consumer.  
National Sharia Board (DSN) 
DSN in Indonesia is somehow independent body that issues the 
economic fatwa case by case. In this context, if BI decides IBs to comply with 
IFSB standard, there are no major activities that should be done under the two 
reasons: DSN has governed the profit and loss sharing in the Fatwa No. 14 and 
15 the year 2000 regarding the mechanism to share the profit to 
depositors/investors. Herewith, the fatwa has stipulated that IBs might choose 
revenue sharing or profit and loss sharing regarding the operation of 
mudhārabah in IBs. And DSN has issued a Fatwa regarding PER numbered 87-
2012.  Moreover, DSN Has not made the Investment Rate Reserve Fatwa yet.  
Indonesia Accountant Board (IAI) 
IAI has a big task to solve the problem regarding the compliance to IFSB 
1, 3, and 4. According to Rosman et al. (2015) these are the main problems of 
IFSB 1, 3, and 4: First, the investment account is no longer classified as the 
deposit since IBs would not give a guarantee to repay the money back to the 
customer as well as the profit. This conclusion is based on the definition of 
financial liabilities in the Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS) 132. 
Alternatively, according to IAI, the case happens since IAI also define financial 
liabilities similar to what MFRS do. Second, AAOIFI has issued Financial 
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Accounting Standards No. 6 and give some solution by classifying the 
investment account as Quasi – Equity. Treating as quasi equity will promote 
risk sharing between bank and IAHs. Rosman et al. (2015) also suggests to all 
countries that will adopt the IFSB 1,3, and 4 to make focused group discussion 
that should be attended by auditors, accountants, sharia scholars and the 
academics to resolve this matter.   
Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (LPS)  
LPS is established since 1998 by the law No. 10 - 1998. LPS is existed as 
the result of 1998 financial crisis (Anshori, 2008; Nasution, 2000). However, in 
the context of investment account, referring to Archer and Karim (2009), there 
should not be a guarantee from any party if IBs want to operate the real 
mudhārabah. In this case, the law 10-1998 governs that all deposit in the banks 
which have an amount below IDR 2 Billion should be insured by the LPS for 
both Islamic and conventional bank. Herewith, if the IFSB guidelines are 
enacted, the investment account would not be guaranteed by the LPS since it is 
categorized as an investment and not deposit. Then LPS only will protect the 
current account.   
 
Conclusion 
The main factor that affects the adoption of IFSB guidelines is the 
political factors that played by Bank Indonesia (BI). In the Law No. 21 - 2008 
regarding the Islamic Banking of Indonesia clause 35 stated that Bank 
Indonesia has coercive power to drive the accounting/governance standard for 
the Indonesian Islamic banking. However, if the model really deployed in 
Indonesia, the benefit is accepted more by the customer since they will be 
educated well by the banks regarding the nature of investment account. 
Moreover, by limiting the demand deposit that only for safekeeping purpose 
will stabilize the payment system and transaction. Nevertheless, the cost of 
operating the IFSB guidelines is not favourable to the IBs since the need of big 
restoration cost and impact directly to the capital structure. Thus if IFSB 
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guidelines are used by Indonesian IBs, the Bank Indonesia (BI) should make a 
decree to state that IBs ought to comply to IFSB Guidelines while Indonesia 
Financial Authority (OJK) should enact a diktat on the matter of governance of 
Investment Account product. The National Sharia Board (DSN) only needs to 
make a new fatwa regarding the Investment Reserve Requirement (IRR). Then 
The Indonesia Accountant Board (IAI) should ensure whether the investment 
account is considered as liability or equity as well as the accounting entry. Last, 
the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Company (LPS) should revise their decree to 
only guarantee the wadiah based product rather than the investment account. 
All of the stakeholder should communicate intensely to make this model 
happen. They can study how Malaysia forming the investment accounts as 
benchmark.   
For the future research, it should be conducted with different approach 
such as using the Analytical Network Process (ANP) with using the Benefit, 
Opportunity, Cost, and Risk (BOCR). After decomposing the BOCR using 
ANP, the questionnaire should be given to all stakeholders that are stated in 
this research to see their opinion on the proposed model.  
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